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He is one of the top anti-ageing Doctors in the U. You might want to consider trying a different supplement, like Dietspotlight Burn , for weight loss. To link these three concepts is simple in TPS and thus lean. Debra on June 13, at Continue reading Show less. Once those foundations are embedded into subconscious memory, it is no longer necessary to focus on them. Please help improve it by replacing them with more appropriate citations to reliable, independent, third-party sources.

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Lean on Pete

The accumulation of waste and energy within the work environment was noticed by motion efficiency expert Frank Gilbreth , who witnessed the inefficient practices of masons who often bend over to gather bricks from the ground. The introduction of a non-stooping scaffold, which delivered the bricks at waist level, allowed masons to work about three times as quickly, and with the least amount of effort.

Frederick Winslow Taylor , the father of scientific management , introduced what are now called standardization and best practice deployment. In Principles of Scientific Management , , Taylor said: And whenever the new method is found to be markedly superior to the old, it should be adopted as the standard for the whole establishment.

Taylor also warned explicitly against cutting piece rates or, by implication, cutting wages or discharging workers when efficiency improvements reduce the need for raw labor: Shigeo Shingo , the best-known exponent of single minute exchange of die and error-proofing or poka-yoke, cites Principles of Scientific Management as his inspiration.

American industrialists recognized the threat of cheap offshore labor to American workers during the s, and explicitly stated the goal of what is now called lean manufacturing as a countermeasure. Henry Towne, past President of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers , wrote in the Foreword to Frederick Winslow Taylor's Shop Management , "We are justly proud of the high wage rates which prevail throughout our country, and jealous of any interference with them by the products of the cheaper labor of other countries.

To maintain this condition, to strengthen our control of home markets, and, above all, to broaden our opportunities in foreign markets where we must compete with the products of other industrial nations, we should welcome and encourage every influence tending to increase the efficiency of our productive processes.

Henry Ford initially ignored the impact of waste accumulation while developing his mass assembly manufacturing system. Charles Buxton Going wrote in Ford, in My Life and Work , [11] provided a single-paragraph description that encompasses the entire concept of waste:. Poor arrangement of the workplace—a major focus of the modern kaizen—and doing a job inefficiently out of habit—are major forms of waste even in modern workplaces. Ford also pointed out how easy it was to overlook material waste.

A former employee, Harry Bennett, wrote:. In other words, Ford saw the rust and realized that the steel plant was not recovering all of the iron. Ford's early success, however, was not sustainable. Womack and Daniel Jones pointed out in "Lean Thinking", what Ford accomplished represented the "special case" rather than a robust lean solution.

This was made clear by Ford's precipitous decline when the company was forced to finally introduce a follow-on to the Model T. Design for Manufacture DFM is a concept derived from Ford which emphasizes the importance of standardizing individual parts as well as eliminating redundant components in My Life and Work. Decades later, the renowned Japanese quality guru, Genichi Taguchi , demonstrated that this "goal post" method of measuring was inadequate.

He showed that "loss" in capabilities did not begin only after exceeding these tolerances, but increased as described by the Taguchi Loss Function at any condition exceeding the nominal condition. This became an important part of W. Edwards Deming 's quality movement of the s, later helping to develop improved understanding of key areas of focus such as cycle time variation in improving manufacturing quality and efficiencies in aerospace and other industries.

While Ford is renowned for his production line, it is often not recognized how much effort he put into removing the fitters' work to make the production line possible.

Previous to the use, Ford's car's components were fitted and reshaped by a skilled engineer at the point of use, so that they would connect properly. Toyota's development of ideas that later became lean may have started at the turn of the 20th century with Sakichi Toyoda , in a textile factory with looms that stopped themselves when a thread broke. This became the seed of autonomation and Jidoka. Toyota's journey with just-in-time JIT may have started back in when it moved from textiles to produce its first car.

Kiichiro Toyoda , founder of Toyota Motor Corporation, directed the engine casting work and discovered many problems in their manufacturing. He decided he must stop the repairing of poor quality by intense study of each stage of the process. In , when Toyota won its first truck contract with the Japanese government, his processes hit new problems and he developed the " Kaizen " improvement teams. Levels of demand in the Post War economy of Japan were low and the focus of mass production on lowest cost per item via economies of scale therefore had little application.

Having visited and seen supermarkets in the USA, Taiichi Ohno recognised the scheduling of work should not be driven by sales or production targets but by actual sales. Given the financial situation during this period, over-production had to be avoided and thus the notion of Pull build to order rather than target driven Push came to underpin production scheduling.

It was with Taiichi Ohno at Toyota that these themes came together. He built on the already existing internal schools of thought and spread their breadth and use into what has now become the Toyota Production System TPS. It is principally from the TPS which was widely referred to in the s as just-in-time manufacturing , but now including many other sources, that lean production is developing.

Norman Bodek wrote the following in his foreword to a reprint of Ford's Today and Tomorrow: I was first introduced to the concepts of just-in-time JIT and the Toyota production system in Subsequently I had the opportunity to witness its actual application at Toyota on one of our numerous Japanese study missions.

There I met Mr. Taiichi Ohno, the system's creator. When bombarded with questions from our group on what inspired his thinking, he just laughed and said he learned it all from Henry Ford's book. Although the elimination of waste may seem like a simple and clear subject, it is noticeable that waste is often very conservatively identified.

This then hugely reduces the potential of such an aim. The elimination of waste is the goal of lean, and Toyota defined three broad types of waste: To illustrate the state of this thinking Shigeo Shingo observed that only the last turn of a bolt tightens it—the rest is just movement.

This ever finer clarification of waste is key to establishing distinctions between value-adding activity, waste and non-value-adding work. One key is to measure, or estimate, the size of these wastes, to demonstrate the effect of the changes achieved and therefore the movement toward the goal.

The "flow" or smoothness based approach aims to achieve JIT, by removing the variation caused by work scheduling and thereby provide a driver, rationale or target and priorities for implementation, using a variety of techniques. The effort to achieve JIT exposes many quality problems that are hidden by buffer stocks; by forcing smooth flow of only value-adding steps, these problems become visible and must be dealt with explicitly.

Muri is all the unreasonable work that management imposes on workers and machines because of poor organization, such as carrying heavy weights, moving things around, dangerous tasks, even working significantly faster than usual. It is pushing a person or a machine beyond its natural limits.

This may simply be asking a greater level of performance from a process than it can handle without taking shortcuts and informally modifying decision criteria.

Unreasonable work is almost always a cause of multiple variations. To link these three concepts is simple in TPS and thus lean. Firstly, muri focuses on the preparation and planning of the process, or what work can be avoided proactively by design. Next, mura then focuses on how the work design is implemented and the elimination of fluctuation at the scheduling or operations level, such as quality and volume.

Muda is then discovered after the process is in place and is dealt with reactively. It is seen through variation in output. It is the role of management to examine the muda , in the processes and eliminate the deeper causes by considering the connections to the muri and mura of the system. The muda and mura inconsistencies must be fed back to the muri , or planning, stage for the next project.

A typical example of the interplay of these wastes is the corporate behaviour of "making the numbers" as the end of a reporting period approaches. Demand is raised to 'make plan,' increasing mura , when the "numbers" are low, which causes production to try to squeeze extra capacity from the process, which causes routines and standards to be modified or stretched.

This stretch and improvisation leads to muri -style waste, which leads to downtime, mistakes and back flows, and waiting, thus the muda of waiting, correction and movement. The original seven mudas are: Eventually, an eighth "muda" was defined by Womack et al. Many others have added the "waste of unused human talent" to the original seven wastes.

For example, Six Sigma includes the waste of Skills, referred to as "under-utilizing capabilities and delegating tasks with inadequate training". Other additional wastes added were for example "space". These wastes were not originally a part of the seven deadly wastes defined by Taiichi Ohno in TPS, but were found to be useful additions in practice.

In Geoffrey Mika in his book, "Kaizen Event Implementation Manual" added three more forms of waste that are now universally accepted; The waste associated with working to the wrong metrics or no metrics, the waste associated with not utilizing a complete worker by not allowing them to contribute ideas and suggestions and be part of Participative Management, and lastly the waste attributable to improper use of computers; not having the proper software, training on use and time spent surfing, playing games or just wasting time.

For a complete listing of the "old" and "new" wastes see Bicheno and Holweg [17]. The identification of non-value-adding work, as distinct from wasted work, is critical to identifying the assumptions behind the current work process and to challenging them in due course. The role of the leaders within the organization is the fundamental element of sustaining the progress of lean thinking.

Experienced kaizen members at Toyota, for example, often bring up the concepts of Senpai , Kohai , and Sensei , because they strongly feel that transferring of Toyota culture down and across Toyota can only happen when more experienced Toyota Sensei continuously coach and guide the less experienced lean champions. One of the dislocative effects of lean is in the area of key performance indicators KPI.

This can be an issue where, for example a truly lean, Fixed Repeating Schedule FRS and JIT approach is adopted, because these KPIs will no longer reflect performance, as the assumptions on which they are based become invalid.

It is a key leadership challenge to manage the impact of this KPI chaos within the organization. Similarly, commonly used accounting systems developed to support mass production are no longer appropriate for companies pursuing lean. Lean accounting provides truly lean approaches to business management and financial reporting. After formulating the guiding principles of its lean manufacturing approach in the Toyota Production System TPS , Toyota formalized in the basis of its lean management: These core management principles are articulated around the twin pillars of Continuous Improvement relentless elimination of waste and Respect for People engagement in long term relationships based on continuous improvement and mutual trust.

This formalization stems from problem solving. As Toyota expanded beyond its home base for the past 20 years, it hit the same problems in getting TPS properly applied that other western companies have had in copying TPS. Like any other problem, it has been working on trying a series of countermeasures to solve this particular concern. These countermeasures have focused on culture: Without the proper behavioral principles and values, TPS can be totally misapplied and fail to deliver results.

As with TPS, the values had originally been passed down in a master-disciple manner, from boss to subordinate, without any written statement on the way. Just as with TPS, it was internally argued that formalizing the values would stifle them and lead to further misunderstanding. However, as Toyota veterans eventually wrote down the basic principles of TPS, Toyota set to put the Toyota Way into writing to educate new joiners. Respect For People is less known outside of Toyota, and essentially involves two defining principles:.

While lean is seen by many as a generalization of the Toyota Production System into other industries and contexts, there are some acknowledged differences that seem to have developed in implementation: Lean principles have been successfully applied to various sectors and services, such as call centers and healthcare. In the former, lean's waste reduction practices have been used to reduce handle time, within and between agent variation, accent barriers, as well as attain near perfect process adherence.

Lean principles also have applications to software development and maintenance as well as other sectors of information technology IT. The challenge in moving lean to services is the lack of widely available reference implementations to allow people to see how directly applying lean manufacturing tools and practices can work and the impact it does have. This makes it more difficult to build the level of belief seen as necessary for strong implementation.

However, some research does relate widely recognized examples of success in retail and even airlines to the underlying principles of lean. The upshot of this is that each implementation often 'feels its way' along as must the early industrial engineering practices of Toyota.

This places huge importance upon sponsorship to encourage and protect these experimental developments. Lean management is nowadays implemented also in non-manufacturing processes and administrative processes. In non-manufacturing processes is still huge potential for optimization and efficiency increase. The espoused goals of lean manufacturing systems differ between various authors.

While some maintain an internal focus, e. Some commonly mentioned goals are: The strategic elements of lean can be quite complex, and comprise multiple elements.

Four different notions of lean have been identified: Lean production has been adopted into other industries to promote productivity and efficiency in an ever changing market. In global supply chain and outsource scale, Information Technology is necessary and can deal with most of hard lean practices to synchronise pull system in supply chains and value system. The manufacturing industry can renew and change strategy of production just in time.

For instance, Dell sells computers directly from their website, cutting franchised dealers out of their supply chains. Then, the firm use outsourced partners to produce its components, deliver components to their assembly plants on these main markets around the world, like America and China.

Zara made decision of speeding their fashion to the consumers market by fast-producing cloths within five weeks with their local partners in Spain and never involved in mass production to pursue new styles and keep products fresh. The other way to avoid market risk and control the supply efficiently is to cut down in stock.

With the improvement of global scale supply chains, firms apply lean practices JIT, supplier partnership, and customer involvement built between global firms and suppliers intensively to connect with consumers markets efficiently.

James Womack had warned Toyota that cooperating with single outsourced suppliers might bring unexpected problems. That is proven as the economy of scale becomes global, the soft-learn practices become more important in their outsourced suppliers, if they could keep good Sensei relationship with their partners and constantly modify production process to perfection.

Otherwise, Toyota begins to consider whether to have more choices of suppliers of producing the same component, it might bring more safety on risk-control and reduce the huge cost that might happen in the future. The appliance of JIT in supply chain system is the key issue of Lean implementation in global scale.

How do the supply partners avoid causing production flow? Global firms should make more suppliers who can compete with each other in order to get the best quality and lower the risk of production flow at the same time. The following steps should be implemented to create the ideal lean manufacturing system: A fundamental principle of lean manufacturing is demand-based flow manufacturing. In this type of production setting, inventory is only pulled through each production center when it is needed to meet a customer's order.

The benefits of this goal include: A continuous improvement mindset is essential to reach the company's goals. The term "continuous improvement" means incremental improvement of products, processes, or services over time, with the goal of reducing waste to improve workplace functionality, customer service, or product performance. Toyota Kata is an opportunity for at least a fundamental understanding of these practices to spread and hopefully generate a bit of a shift.

It is a validation of what you have been doing. That is the good news. The bad news is that it is going to be enormously difficult to get this piece into place in most companies. The Toyota Production System was never designed. There are no specifications or blueprints. It grew, and continues to grow, organically. We learn about how it works by studying it. Therefore, our knowledge and understanding should be continuing to evolve and grow, as indeed, the TPS itself continues to evolve.

In the early days we looked at the TPS through the eyes of engineers. We regarded it as a machine. If we could just see all of the parts and pieces, and understand how they work, we could reverse engineer the machine. In his doctoral research, however, Steven Spear took a different look.

He went in with social science eyes rather than engineering eyes. This has been at best misleading, and resulted in a graveyard of failed efforts to adopt the TPS. The term kata is found mostly in the study of Asian martial arts. Once those foundations are embedded into subconscious memory, it is no longer necessary to focus on them.

Though they are not called kata , the basic drills that any athlete learns are foundational in the same way. This does bring up my first quibble about the book.

I wish it had a different title. So what is new here? In my opinion, Rother does the best job so far of setting the context — describing the improvement culture and environment if you will — of any popular press publication so far.

In addition, there is an overarching theme which compares this style of management with what is traditional taught and practiced in most business. But nobody ever really defines what that means. I suppose there might be cases where this approach has worked and sustained. In The High Velocity Edge formerly titled Chasing the Rabbit , Steven Spear points out several examples, including Toyota, where there is a strong explicit, or implicit, sense of an uncompromising direction.

So, again, while this is not a new concept, Rother turns up the contrast and elevates it to a prominent position in decision making and direction setting. We know that lean means eliminate waste, so reducing the lot size is not a good idea. Thank you for pointing that out. However the fact that we want to reduce lot sizes is not optional nor open for discussion because it moves us closer to our vision of a one-by-one flow. Rather than losing time discussing whether or not we should reduce the lot size, please turn your attention to those two obstacles standing in the way of our progress.

This, in my view, is one of the most important policy decisions a management team can make. It gives people a foundation of consistency. Rother goes on to point out how this sense of direction re-shapes cost-benefit analysis. The question being answered is now not whether we will make this decision, but rather whether the solution is adequate, or we must keep looking for a better one.

In reality, though, no one has any idea what the clear path is. If you think about it a comprehensive project plan assumes that we have such a clear grasp of the current condition and already know what must be done to get us to the desired end state.

In reality, we are driving on a winding road in the dark. We can only see as far as our headlights. Because there is a strong sense of direction, it makes sense to set an immediate target just beyond what we can achieve today.

While there is no clear path to the notional end state, the target condition is much closer, so the immediate issues that must be overcome are plainly visible. While this is somewhat understood in general principle, Rother takes it down a couple of layers. Only by setting an objective, and then trying to hit it can we learn why we cannot. That, in turn, becomes the focus for kaizen. The example that will most challenge a lot of practitioners out there is takt time as a t arget condition.

This is one of the few mainstream books that gets beyond the overly-simplistic notion of takt time only as the rate of customer demand. Rother acknowledges that, internally, there is an intentional overspeed built into the system as a target. And here is the key point: You rarely hit the target. At least not at first. It is established as something to strive for, step by step, each day. The common excuses and obstacles we are used to hearing are turned around into those challenges.

The work cycle is too unbalanced to achieve one-by-one flow? OK — then that is the focus or our kaizen activity until we break down that problem. The kanban discipline broke down? Can we run this way? Rather than using the problem as a barrier, it become the next challenge. Rother goes into quite a bit of detail for each of the common tools, and resets the commonly held idea that they are something to implement.

I am glad for this chapter because it clarifies or contradicts? We are finally starting to move beyond that anchor and understand that these tools are not the fundamentals of lean. The entire concept of a target condition, that describes not simply the performance but the operating characteristics of the system, is a critical one. The vision of ideal sets the general direction for forward progress, the target condition issues a clear done-or-not-done challenge for the next step.

Perhaps that was the intention all along. But Learning to See and its publishers are vague about that, and many companies have tried to reach too far into the ideal with their future state with the idea that it describes an end game rather than the next challenge. Of course if the target could be achieved today, it is a poorly set target. There are likely problems to solve. Where we commonly fall short in problem solving is trying to take on too much at once.

We try to take on complex problems, create elaborate dependencies, and work on multiple things at the same time. Rother, on the other hand, points out that rapid, linear solution of small problems, focusing on single issues and single countermeasures, lets us gain that process understanding — and increase our profound knowledge in the process. A really telling chart on the crucial difference between a problem solving culture and a problem avoiding culture is in the section titled What Toyota Emphasizes in Problem Solving.

Apply several countermeasures at once. This little chart covers a lot of ground. So while solving the problem is the goal, it is only acceptable to solve it in a way that improves understanding.

A blind solution is no solution. Logically, of course, this makes sense. But in real life it is extraordinarily difficult in the heat of the moment, with people demanding a quick fix, to exercise this kind of discipline.

And as each countermeasure is applied, the next problem becomes apparent — and that problem is the next barrier to better performance. Progress can be made very quickly in this way because there is a much reduced risk of leaving problems behind us as we move forward. First, they spend an inordinate amount of time deciding which problem to work on.

While that may feel like working on solving problems, no actual progress is being made. Maybe this is because if feels like a waste of time to work on the simple issues.

We learn about designed experiments, statistical analysis, stratification techniques. Some problems require this kind of work, but not very many. Worse, learning to solve those problems well requires a thorough grounding in the fundamental logic which is best learned by solving lots of problems. The only way to solve lots of problems is to start with the simple ones, but apply rigorous methods in doing so. We are trying to teach multivariate calculus before we learn algebra.

Toyota avoids this issue because they develop these skills from the basics, at the very start of their employment. Teaching the fundamentals — the entry level stuff — to senior people with advanced career positions can be problematic. More about that later. Even in the rare organizations that have fantastic problem solving and kaizen skills, the development of people often a very weak process.

There is no systematic approach to doing it. Then, at the end of the rating period, the team member is evaluated on his performance against those goals. And both of these functions are usually delegated to Human Resources rather than being clearly owned and adminstered by line leaders. Rother, on the other hand, describes a process of mentoring. The boss has skin in the game because he is accountable to his boss for the results. Yet he does not direct solutions. He guides the subordinate through the process of solving the problem in the correct way.

In the end, it is the team member, not the boss, who comes up with the solution, and the boss has to live with whatever it is as long as it works. What is critical to understand here is a difference in who carries out improvements.

In most of our companies, improvements are the domain of skilled staff specialists. These are the people who plan and lead kaizen events, or carry out black belt projects, or whatever improvement process is used. Those people are probably quite good at what they do, but they are the only ones who do it. The attention is always on solving the problem. Yes, they go through the motions of developing people — they teach them the principles, they guide them to the correct solution, but in the end, the process of how to improve is the domain of the specialists.

This is, in reality, a very traditional approach — a slight evolution from the practices outlined by Fredrick Taylor in The other key point is that in the Toyota-type environment, the entire operation is built around flagging problems immediately.

Spear describes how work, information flows, material flows, and indeed the flow of problem solving itself is deliberately structured to always be testing against an explicit intent. In this environment, the vast majority of problems are discovered and handled while they are relatively small and manageable. Where Toyota deliberately stops the process at the first hint of trouble, other organizations run it until it is so overwhelmed that it is brought to its knees.

Following that, in the Toyota-environment, someone other than the production operator responds to the problem. This, again, is a huge contrast. But if you think about it, the only thing the production worker can do is work around the problem enough to keep moving.

Trying to do so is leaving people on their own, without support from the rest of the organization. In the end, not only is the problem fixed, but the profound knowledge of the entire organization has improved.

True, but what happens next is critical. The leader is responsible for the issue until the system is not only restored, but improved.

With one mindset, things get a little worse. With the other, they get better. Rother describes this process with a few stories and examples that make the point very well. So does John Shook in Managing to Learn.

One thing I like about this book over many others is that Rother goes beyond just describing an ideal environment. In Chapter 9 Developing Improvement Kata Behavior in Your Organization he openly discusses the very real barriers that an organization must surmount to get this thinking and practice into place.

He is, of course, talking about a fundamental change in culture. This is true of a national or ethnic culture as much as a corporate culture. The coaching kata describes a specific way that people interact with one another when solving a problem.

Therefore, this is not something that can be taught to individuals. Rother is clear about a couple of things. First is that nobody has succeeded in doing this as well as Toyota yet. We are cutting new ground here. There is no clear path to the end state. There is a clear vision for what the end state looks like, and each of us should know or be able to assess the current state in our individual organizations. If this sounds familiar, it is. Rother is describing a process of using the very principles discussed in the book to put these patterns into place.

Because when the practices are applied correctly, they work. Continuous and conscious practice with the oversight of a coach. Every world-class athlete in the world has a coach. Only the coach can observe her performance objectively and see what must be adjusted to improve it. I always wonder why it is that, in business or operations, we believe that once some level is reached there is no need for this. This is, of course, silly. Rother proposes to start at the top with the basics — not because they end up as the primary coaches.

No, that is primarily the domain of the middle managers and below. But because someone has to coach those middle managers , and it has to come from above. I would add that starting in the middle puts those people in an untenable position because they are being taught to behave in ways that their bosses do not understand. Getting the top level team not only involved, but embedded, in the process is a countermeasure. I am not going to go into a lot of detail and spoil the book.

Get it and read it. Form your own view on this. Just understand that getting this thinking into place is a big deal. Like every book before it, Toyota Kata is targeted primarily at senior leaders.

Like most books of these books, its primary readers are going to be technical practitioners. Those technical practitioners are the ones leading the classroom training, leading the kaizen workshops or black belt projects. They are the ones who are doing most of the things that do not work. Odds are you are one of those people if you are reading this blog, and odds are you are the only one who will be reading this book.

First, practice this stuff on your own. It will feel awkward. Get as good at this as you can. Then start altering how you run your events.

Shift them to changing the behavior of team leaders and supervisors. Teach them to see, clear, and solve problems quickly.

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